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Abstract 
Organization economics, with its two main strands of transaction cost economics and 
agency theory, primarily deals with the question of how organizations emerge and 
survive. It focuses on the analysis of competition within hierarchies (organizations) 
rather than markets and addresses questions such as why organizations exist, how they 
are managed, why some perform better than others, and why they tend to cooperate. 
This study attempts to juxtapose other relevant perspectives and organization theories 
to bear on the same questions. The purpose is to understand where and how 
organization economics and other perspectives converge and diverge. The study 
depends on the work of famous scholars contributing to various perspectives for 
drawing conclusions. 
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Introduction 
Modern organizations are complex and managers require a good deal of understanding 
to properly manage them. Not only are organizations complex but have to satisfy 
different stakeholders with (most often) conflicting goals. Both academicians and 
practitioners have come up with various theories and perspectives to facilitate better 
understanding of how organizations come into being, how structural and cultural 
characteristics affect their performance, and why some of them eventually decline and 
die. 
Organization economics is concerned with the question of how organizations emerge 
and survive. It deals with the analysis of competition within hierarchies (organizations) 
rather than markets. For organizational economists, organizations exist in “seething 
caldrons” of competition where individuals, institutions, and governments all seek to 
obtain some part of the success that a particular firm may enjoy (Moran & Goshal, 
1996). As a distinct perspective, it attempts to answer such questions as: 
i. Why organizations exist? 
ii. How firms should be managed? 
iii. Why some organizations perform better than others?, and 
iv. Why organizations tend to cooperate? 
The economists Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975) explored the question by 
focusing on the transaction costs that are incurred in exchange relationships. 
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Transaction cost theory, a variant of organization economics, explores the question of 
why organizations exist. In his influential article, “the nature of the firm”, Coase 
(1937) argued that negotiating, writing, and enforcing exchange contracts are costly. If 
there is uncertainty, firms must collect information on the value, price, quality, and 
availability of resources. A firm or organization may decide to reduce these costs by 
producing the resources itself or acquiring them from other firms. In other words, the 
reason for existence of firms is their ability to reduce cost of certain transactions. 
According to Williamson (1975), markets and hierarchies (governance mechanisms) 
are alternative instruments for completing a set of transactions. In general, mark forms 
of governance rely on prices, competition, and contracts to keep all parties to an 
exchange informed of their rights and responsibilities. Hierarchical forms of 
governance, on the other hand, bring parties to an exchange under direct control of a 
third party. These authoritative third parties then attempt to keep all parties to an 
exchange informed of their rights and responsibilities. Economic actors choose that 
form of governance (market or hierarchy) that reduces any potential exchange 
problems created by bounded rationality or the threat of opportunism. 
The second stream of research within organizational economics, typified by agency 
theory, relates to answering the question of whether those associated with the firm 
agree about how it should be managed. 
The agency theory, originally developed by Meckling (1976), focuses on the 
relationship between managers and stockholders. According to this theory, agency 
relationship occurs whenever one partner in a transaction (the principal) delegates 
authority to another (the agent) with the welfare of the principal affected by the choices 
of the agent. The delegation is problematic in that: (a) the interests of principal and 
agent will typically diverge; (b) the principal cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor 
the actions of the agent; and (c) the principal cannot perfectly acquire the information 
available to or possessed by the agent. These conditions constitute the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior on the part of agent against the welfare of the principal. 
Assuming that agency costs exist, it is clear that both the principal and the agent have 
strong incentives to minimize these costs. Thus, the principal and the agent have 
common interests in defining a monitoring and incentive structure that reduces 
outcomes as close as possible to what would be the case if information exchange were 
costless. The two sources of agency problems are the moral hazard and adverse 
selection on the part of agent. 
The Strategic Management Theory developed by Porter (2008) addresses the question 
of why do some organizations outperform others. Porter has developed the five forces 
model of environmental threats and identified strategies to reduce such threats. The 
threats are: threat of rivalry, threat of substitute, threat of suppliers, threat of buyers and 
the thread of new entry. These threats either reduce the revenue of the firm or increase 
the cost the firm. Porter (2008) has identified different strategies to reduce these threats 
like exploiting economies of scale, differentiating products, and lobbying imposition of 
barriers to entry. 
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Cooperative Organizational Economics relates to collusion and strategic alliance of 
different firms in order to possess a monopolistic position or to enhance efficiency 
(Axelrod, 1984). A set of firms is said to be colluding when they cooperate to reduce 
the total output of products or services in an industry below what would be the case if 
they were competing in that industry (Bensaou, 1999). The collusion may either be 
explicit or tacit. Strategic alliance, on the other hand, is aimed to exploit resource 
complementarily. The resources controlled by two or more firms are complementary 
when their economics value combined is greater than their economic value separately 
(Gulati & Singh, 1998). There are two broad classes of strategic alliance: Contractual 
Alliance and Join Venture. The purpose of contractual alliance is to develop, design, 
manufacture, market or distribute products or services and where a separate firm is not 
created to manage this relationship. This relationship is managed through some sort of 
contract. Unlike tacit collusion, the effect of contractual alliance is to increase 
economic activities, not to reduce economic activities below the competitive level. 
Joint ventures are also cooperative relationship with the purpose of developing, 
designing, manufacturing, marketing products or services. Unlike contractual alliances, 
joint ventures always involve the creation of a separate firm to manage this relationship 
(Heide & John, 1990). 
Insight from other Perspectives 
The rational perspective, developed by classical economists (such as Adam Smith) and 
sociologists (such as Max Weber), is the most widely accepted and the one with the 
most compelling arguments concerning the origins of organizations. It attributes the 
emergence of organizations to the division and coordination of labour. Division of 
work implies that different people perform different activities because of the need to 
apply special skills to tasks for improving efficiency (Greif, 1995).  And to the extent 
that the various skills required are of differential complexity, variable incentives 
structures evolved. Weber placed great emphasis on technical expertise and a fixed 
division of labour among officials (Weber, 1922). When work is divided, someone 
must oversee and coordinate the division so that each activity is rationally linked to the 
principal goal in addition to fixing responsibility for failure. In other words, horizontal 
division of labour is usually accompanied by a vertical hierarchy that provides 
oversight and thus organization comes into being (Smythe, et al., 2000). 
The human relations perspective, developed and promoted by scholars such as 
McGregor (1960), Barnard (1938), and Eltan Mayoinsists that organizations are 
cooperative systems that have come into existence because of the limitations of 
individuals. The organizations rely on the willingness of participants to make 
contributions. A variety of incentives can be used to induce participants including 
material rewards, opportunities for distinction, prestige, and power (Mitchell & Lason, 
1987). According to Chester Barnard, formal organizations arise out of and are 
necessary to informal organizations but when formal organizations come into 
operation, they create and require informal organizations. In formal structures facilitate 
communication, maintain cohesiveness, and promote willingness to serve the 
organization. 
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The contingency perspective, which is based on the work of Lawrence and Lorch 
(1967) and Woodworth (1965) who argue that appropriate managerial action and 
organization design depend on the particular parameters of the situation. As opposed to 
rational approach, which seeks universal principles to be applicable to every situation, 
contingency theory attempts to identify contingency factors (e.g. organizational size, 
strategy, competition, and technology etc.) that prescribe an appropriate design and 
action (Luthans, 1973). In other words, there is no one best organizational form or 
decision but many, and their suitability is determined by the goodness of fit between 
organizational form and environment or a particular decision and situation (Lawrance 
& Lorsch, 1967). Similar to the contingency perspective, transaction cost theory (a 
version of organizational economics) argues that markets and hierarchies are 
alternative instruments for completing a set of transactions. The economic actors will 
choose that form of governance (contingency) that reduces any potential exchange 
problems created by bounded rationality and the threat of opportunism. 
According to Neo-Marxist perspective, organizations are social structures that protect 
and further the interest of the capitalist class (Braverman, 1974). Since the capitalist 
cannot personally supervise each task directly owing to physical, mental, or time 
constraints, he has to develop control mechanism in the form of organizational 
hierarchies and formal rules. The agency theory has an alternative explanation for the 
emergence of hierarchy and other control mechanisms. According to agency theory the 
delegation of authority from principal to agent is inevitable (cognitive and time 
constraints of the principal) but problematic in that the interests of principal and agent 
will typically diverge. Thus, the principal and agent have common interests in defining 
and monitoring and incentive structure that produces outcomes for less agency costs. 
Another useful perspective for understanding organizations is the resource dependence 
approach. It means that organizations depend on the environment but strive to acquire 
control over resources to minimize their dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Organizations are vulnerable if vital resources are controlled by other organizations, so 
they try to be as much independent as possible. Organizations seek to reduce 
vulnerability with respect to resources by developing linkages with other organizations 
(Scott, 1981). Organization linkages require coordination which reduces the freedom of 
each organization to make decisions without concern for the needs and goals of other 
organizations. Dependence on shared resources gives power to other organizations. 
Organizational economics views the acquisition of resources from the environment as 
necessary for survival and organizations try to control resources by entering into 
strategic alliances with others. Porter (2008) developed a powerful model that firms 
use to choose and implement strategies that will generate above normal economic 
performance. Porter identified five set of threats to the profits of the firm in an 
industry: the threat of rivalry, the threat of entry, the threat of substitutes, the threat of 
suppliers and the threat of buyers. 
All these threats act to either reduce a firm’s revenues or increase its economic costs. 
The firm profits can motivate entry from at least two sources: from firms entering an 
industry from the outside, or from firms that are already in an industry entering into a 
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new segment of that industry. According to institutional perspective, just as 
organizations need efficient production to survive, they need legitimacy from the 
stakeholders as well (Meyer, & Rowan, 1977). It describes how organizations survive 
and succeed through congruence between an organization and the expectations from 
the environment. This view believes that organizations adopt structures and processes 
to please outsiders, and these activities come to take on rule-like status in organizations 
(Meyer, & Scott, 1983). Thus, according to the institutional perspective, organizations 
have two essential dimensions—technical and institutional. The technical dimension is 
the day to day work technology and operating requirements. The institutional structure 
is that part of the organization most visible to the outside public.  The technical part is 
governed by norms of rationality  and  efficiency,  but  the  institutional  dimension  is  
governed  by expectations  from the  external  environment  (Meyer & Rowan, 1990). 
Organizations adapt to the environment by signaling their congruence with the 
demands and expectations stemming from cultural norms, standards set by professional 
bodies, funding agencies, and customers. 
According to the network perspective, many organizations now occupy a middle 
ground between markets and hierarchies that are referred to as network organizations 
(Hamilton, 1986). Network organizations are temporary alliances, arrangements, or 
agreements designed to combine the core competencies and capacities of different 
firms for the purpose of research, design, and production for a particular market 
(Powell, et al., 1996).  The network is characterized by cooperation, collaboration, and 
the sharing of information. The network reduces the problem of sunk costs in capital, 
inventory, and labour (Uzzi, 1997). Organization economics does not advocate any 
particular governance mechanism. According to transaction cost economics (a stream 
of organization economics), the choice of any governance mechanism (market, 
hierarchy, network) primarily depends on the cost of transaction which is affected by 
many factors including cost incurred on breach of contract and frequency of 
transaction. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
There has been a proliferation of literature on the choice of organizational forms from 
the perspective of Organization Economics (OE) where the underlying argument is 
based on efficiency. According to OE, some forms of governance (market, hierarchy, 
and network) are better in terms of transaction costs than others. Organization 
Economics, with its two main streams—transaction cost theory and agency theory—
implicitly assumes that markets are efficient due to scale of economies, specialization, 
administrative costs and incentives (Boerner & Macher, 2001).  But because contracts 
are incomplete due to future uncertainty and weak legal systems, markets may incur 
additional costs which leads to the firm becoming a cheaper alternative (Leiblein, 
2003). However, hierarchical governance provides weaker incentives for performance 
because of team work (Leiblein, 2003). But there are then agency costs associated with 
hierarchy form of organization because of opportunism and asymmetry of information. 
Organization Economics, therefore, has been and will continue to be an important set of 
theoretical tools for the analysis of organizational phenomena. It addresses some of the 
most fundamental issues in organizational research and complements other theories of 
the firm to fully explain how organizations actually work. It, though, provides a useful 
lens through which various forms of organizations, is complete in all ways. A more 
useful approach toward building a science of organization would be to integrate legal, 
economic, sociological, and institutional perspectives. Focusing on any single 
perspective, however powerful it may be overshadows much of the empirical 
regularities thereby limiting its capacity to guide practice. 
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